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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
Authority for said appeal is found within the confine of Rule 26 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure; Utah State Constitution Article 1, Section 12; Utah 
Code Annotated Section 77-1 6(g); and Section 78-2-2 (i) Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Defendant challenges the trial court rulings: 
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1. The Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and also his motion to 
arrest judgment. Defendant argued the evidence was insufficient to justify 
a finding that the defendant was incapable of driving his vehicle in an 
unsafe manner. 
2. The Court denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Defendant 
argued the officer lacked reasonable cause to stop and detain him. No 
violations of the law were observed by the officer. The stop was solely 
based on a call to dispatch by a citizen caller. The citizen reported he 
suspected defendant as intoxicated. When question by dispatch as to this 
conclusion, the citizen advised his conclusion was based on two factors: 
odor of alcohol; and he had talked to the caller's son. 
3. The defendant sought to exclude any comment on the defendant 
assertion of his Fifth Amendment rights. When asked by the officer to 
perform such both dexterity and chemical testing, the defendant advised 
simply 'fifth amendment'. Over objection, the Court permitted the State 
use the assertion of the constitutional right as evidence of guilt. See 
Defendant's Motion in Limine. 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
Defendant was tried before a jury on the date of April 7 & 8,2008. The trial 
judge was Judge Claudia Laycock. The defendant was accused of driving under the 
influence of alcohol, a third degree felony. The offense was enhanced to a felony 
ratpnorization due to prior convictions. A jury found the defendant guilty. 
FACTUAL STATEMENT 
The evidence in the case rested on the testimony of Kimberly Reynolds (trial 
transcript pages 18-26); Heidi Bird (trial transcript 26-43); Ms Heidi Bird's husband 
Travis Bird (trial transcript 43-56); Spanish Fork police officer Matt Johnson (trial 
transcript 57-89) and fellow officers Phillip Nielsen (trial transcript 89-94) Trent 
Shepherd (trial transcript 94-97), Daniel Herrin (trial transcript 97-110). 
Prior to trial, the defendant motioned the trial court to suppress evidence. 
Defendant argued reasonable cause did not exist to justify a level two detention. 
The court denied the motion. The court rested its decision on the basis of a dispatch 
call made by a citizen, Travis Bird. Travis Bird's call was recorded and played at the 
January 15, 2008 hearing on the motion to suppress. The transcript of the dispatch 
call is set out in detail in the addendum. The relevant portion provides: 
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Dispatch: Ok. And can you tell me why you think he was intoxicated? 
Travis Bird: Oh, he walked right pass me and my son and he was trying to 
talk to my son. You could smell it on his breath and my wife smelled him too. 
The guy was just clearly intoxicated. He was just, the way he was acting. He 
tried to strike up a conversation with my little boy. 
The Court denied the defendant's motion to suppress. (January 15,2008 
Suppression Hearing). The Court found the citizen informant (Travis Bird) reported a 
intoxicated driver. Bird had reported the basis to believe Mr. Van Dyke to be 
intoxicated was: 
a. He walked past Mr. Bird and his son, who the driver tried to talk 
b. Both Mr. Bird and his wife smell alcohol on the driver's breath. 
The trial court found Officer Johnson saw no traffic violations. The Court 
found Officer Johnson's testimony inconsistent referencing the weaving within the 
lane of travel.(Suppression hearing of January 9, 2008 Page 7). At the preliminary 
hearing, the officer had reported the vehicle in the center dividing lane and weaving 
within the lane of travel. (SH 7 L. 22). The officer had reported making contact with 
the dividing line but under cross-examination he reported to be within the lane of 
travel. (SH 9 L1-5). At the preliminary hearing, Officer Johnson had testified Mr. Van 
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Dyke was in the far right travel lane. He testified that vehicle moved within his lane of 
travel. (Preliminary Hearing 26 L. 1-12). He was consistent in noting that he saw no 
traffic violations. 
The trial court read the court's denial of defendant's motion into the record 
and provided a copy of the ruling to both parties. See addendum. The Court 
concluded: 
1. Defendant was weaving within the lane of travel and had not committed 
any traffic offenses. 
2. The Court concluded that weaving within the lane of travel alone does not 
amount to reasonable suspicion. 
3. The trial court justified the stop by looking to the dispatch call from Travis 
Bird alone. The Court looked to the conclusion of Mr. Bird that Mr. Van 
Dyke was thoroughly intoxicated. The Court failed to address the reasons 
given by Bird when the dispatcher questioned his conclusion of 
intoxication. 
4. The trial court then concluded that the officer independently observed the 
defendant's driving pattern, which not a violation of the law, corroborated 
Bird's observations. The trial court did not make any findings referencing 
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what observations corroborated a conclusion of being an impaired driver. 
(Suppression Hearing January 15,2008). The Court's ruling is attached in 
the addendum. 
The defendant also filed a motion to forbid the State from using as evidence 
of guilt the defendant's assertion of his Fifth Amendment rights. The Court denied 
the motion prior to trial. 
At trial, the Court allowed the officer to testify that he requested Mr. Van Dyke 
perform field sobriety tests and Mr. Van Dyke replied 'fifth amendment'. (Trial 
Transcript 69 L. 4 / TT 70 L. 5). The officer also asked the defendant to perform a 
chemical test. . He advised again "Fifth Amendment". (TT 70 L 9 / TT 71 L. 15). 
Officer Johnson did not advise Mr. Van Dyke of any consequences of a refusal to the 
chemical tests. Nor did Johnson advise the right to remain silent and the right to 
counsel do not apply to the officer's request as required by statute. 
The evidence produce at trial was again inconsistent as to a state of 
intoxication or being an impaired driver. Ms Reynolds advised the jury that she 
worked at the sports park in Spanish Fork, Utah. (TT 18 L. 22-25). She kept score 
for the various baseball games played at the park on September 25, 2007. (TT 19 L. 
20-24). Mr. Van Dyke and Ms Reynolds had a conversation referencing 
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rescheduling of a baseball game Mr. Van Dyke was a participant. (TT 20-21 111 20 L. 
10) 
The State called Reynolds to testify to Mr. Van Dyke's demeanor or state of 
intoxication. (TT 6). She, however, testified that he was angry but that she had no 
other concerns with his demeanor. (TT 22). She reported an odor of alcohol but 
reported no evidence of intoxication. Upon direct question she denied observing 
even any slurred speech. (TT 22 L. 26) 
Heidi Bird testified that she and her husband (Travis) were at her son's soccer 
game at the sports park. (TT 27 L. 11). As they were leaving, Mr. Van Dyke was 
also leaving. She noticed Mr. Van Dyke teasing with her six year old son. (TT 28 L. 
2-22/ TT 40 L. 5). She noticed nothing remarkable about his speech but only being 
loud (TT 29 L. 16) and chuckling (TT 39 L. 25). She had no further concerns about 
his conduct. (TT 29 L 16). 
She did not note an odor of alcohol (TT 37 L. 3) until he walked past her 
nearing the parking lot. (TT 29 L. 24). She watched him as he went to his car. He 
had a limp favoring his left leg. (TT 30/33). However, he was carrying a large 
baseball bag over his left shoulder. (TT 31/32). She witnessed his driving pattern 
and offered the criticism that he was overly cautious. (TT 34 L. 8). Her husband had 
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not noted the odor of alcohol initially contrary to his dispatch call.(TT 34 L. 19/ TT 51 
L.3) 
However, Travis Bird, at trial, reported Mr. Van eyes to be glazed (TT 45 L. 
15-20); this despite the fact that Mr. Van Dyke was wearing sunglasses. (TT 47 L. 
22). He also reported his speech to be slurred although his initial report to the 
police noted the speech was only awkward. (TT 48 L13). 
To dispatch, Mr. Bird called to report that "he walked right passed me and my 
son and he was trying to talk to my son". (TT 47 L. 1-5). Again contrary to his report 
to dispatch, he reported Van Dyke did not smell of the alcohol but his wife alone had 
observed the odor. (TT 47 L. 8 / TT 55 L. 20). 
He reported that he believed Mr. Van Dyke was driving cautiously (TT 52 L. 
9) He could not conclude whether Mr. Van Dyke was unsafe to drive a car. (TT 54 L. 
24). 
Officer Matt Johnson testified that he responded to the dispatch call and 
pulled in behind the Van Dyke vehicle. (TT 63 L. 11-16) He noted the vehicle 
weaved within its lane of travel. (TT 63 L. 18-22). Contrary to the Court's findings, 
he reported that the vehicle did not contact the fog line. (TT 64 L. 4). He followed 
the vehicle for 9.5 blocks. (TT 64 L. 6-9). He pulled in behind the vehicle and 
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initiated his overhead lights as the vehicle pulled into to park near a business. (TT 
64 L. 16-20). He saw no traffic violations. (TT 65 L.1). 
The officer noted an odor of alcohol. (TT 66 L 12). He reported VanDyke's 
speech as being slurred (TT 68 L 20) and he was slow to respond. He asked him to 
step from the vehicle to perform field sobriety tests (TT 69 L 2) and Mr. Van Dyke 
advised "Fifth". (TT 70 L 3). Officer Johnson then immediately put him under arrest. 
(TT 70 L 9). He noted no difficulties with his balance. (TT 70 L 24.). Post arrest, 
Johnson asked him to complete three chemical tests (breath, blood, urine) and again 
VanDyke responded "Fifth". (TT 70 L 15). Johnson advised that interpreted this to 
be a denial. (TT 71 L19). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. 
The evidence did not justify a conviction based on an impaired driver where 
all the evidence suggested the defendant drove his vehicle in a lawful and safe 
fashion. 
2. 
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A finding by the trial court that the call to dispatch by Travis Bird was 
sufficient to justify a stop is in error. When questioned by dispatch as to his 
conclusion that Mr. Van Dyke was intoxicated, Mr. Bird reported that he smell of 
alcohol and had talked to his son. These two observations do not amount to a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. The officer may follow such a vehicle to 
ascertain any criminal conduct but he may not conduct a level two detention absent 
some corroboration of criminal behavior. As noted by the trial court's ruling a failure 
to follow a perfect vector down the highway would subject a substantial portion of the 
public to an invasion of their privacy each and every day. 
3. 
Here, the trial court allowed the State to comment on the defendant's 
imposition of his Fifth Amendment rights as evidence of guilt. Defendant had a right 
not to produce evidence against himself under the U.S. Constitution and the Utah 
State Constitution. When he invoked his right to not perform the field sobriety tests 
or the chemical test requested, this should never be used as evidence of guilt. If 
allowed, it impairs or destroys the privilege. 
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DETAILED ARGUMENT 
Point 1 
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
The language of the U.C.A. 41-6a-502 provides: 
(1) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a 
Vehicle within this state if the person:... 
(b) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle; 
The State is thereby required to prove that the defendant was incapable of 
safely operating a vehicle. The evidence is to the contrary. Heidi Bird reported her 
only criticism was that he was an overly cautious driver. See Sandy City v. 
Thorsness, 778 P.2d 1011 (Utah Ct.App.1989)(a prudent driving is not suspicious but 
is to be commended). Her husband also noted that the was a cautious driver. 
Officer Johnson confirmed this by finding no traffic violations to justify a stop. 
Driving safely does not lend to a finding of 'reasonable cause' to detain let 
alone a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Salt Lake City v. Bench; 2008 Ut. 
App. 30,177 P. 3d 655; State v. Roybai. 2008 Ut. App 286; Sandy City v. Thorsness, 
778 P. 2d 1011,1012-13 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
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Here, the record is absent of an observations of a traffic violations or any 
impairment. The record reports his should be categorized as not only safe but alert 
and conscious of all hazards of the road. 
The language of the U.C.A. 41-6a-502 requires proof that the defendant was 
under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and 
any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
Here the evidence is not only lacking but to the contrary. The defendant operated 
his vehicle in a cautious / overly cautious fashion. 
Although a jury verdict is given due reverence but it is subject to challenge 
where it is so "inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime". 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443,444 (Utah 1983). See also State v. Hirschi, 2007 UT 
App 255 167 P.3d 503 (defendant appealed his conviction of forcible sexual abuse 
arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. The Court 
concluded that the State's evidence was sufficiently inconclusive for a jury to find, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that Hirschi touched the victim's buttocks.) State v. 
Hamilton,8 27 P. 2d 232, 236 (Utah 1992); State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342,345 
(Utah 1985); State v. Brooks. 563 P.2d 799 (Utah 1977). 
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Point 2 
LEGALITY OF TRAFFIC STOP 
The balance between public interest and the individual's constitutionally 
guaranteed right to personal security and privacy favors freedom from police 
interference. Brown v. Texas, U. S. 47 (1979). In a free country founded on 
principles of personal liberty, a person has a right to be free from police intervention. 
Such guarantees are guarded by both the Fourth Amendment and Art. I Section 14 
of the Utah State Constitution. 
Here, no search warrant exist nor probable cause to arrest. The justification 
for the stop has to base on a reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior. However as 
the trial court noted the officer saw no traffic violations justifying a traffic stop. 
The officer's stop had to be based on the dispatch call of a intoxicated driver. 
The officer found no corroboration of criminal behavior as he followed the vehicle for 
nine and one-half (9.5) blocks. The stop has to be based on the citizen's report 
alone. Travis Bird concluded via the report to dispatch that VanDyke was intoxicated 
but when questioned upon this conclusion, he offered the observation the defendant 
had talked to his young son and had also smelled of alcohol; nothing more. 
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Traffic Stops 
A traffic stop is a "major interference in the lives of the [vehicle's] 
occupants." Coolidge v. New Hampshire,403 U.S. 443,479 (1971). Significant 
interests are at stake when determining the permissibility of a traffic stop. An 
invasion of privacy occurs every time a law enforcement officer stops a car, 
regardless of the motivation for the stop. This necessarily implicates the Fourth 
Amendment and Art. I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
Exception to the Warrant Clause 
In Terry v. Ohio, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed that, although 
investigative stops are seizures within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, in 
some circumstances police officers may conduct such stops even where there is no 
probable cause to make an arrest. 392 U.S. 1,22 (1968). Such a stop must be 
based on more than an officer's "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch.'" 
Id. at 27. The officer "must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, 
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" the 
intrusion of the stop. Id. at 21. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,809-10 (1996). 
The burden to establish that an investigative stop is reasonable falls on the State. 
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WEAVING WITHIN A LANE OF TRAVEL 
"[Repeated weaving within a single lane" is a malleable enough standard that it 
can be interpreted to cover much innocent conduct. In U.S. v. Lyons, 7 F.3d 973,974 
(10th Cir. 1993), a police officer made an investigatory stop after having seen the 
defendant's vehicle weave three to four times within a single lane. The court 
recognized "the universality of drivers' 'weaving' in their lanes." Id. at 976. The Court 
cautioned that allowing weaving to justify a vehicle stop may subject many innocent 
people to an investigation. "Indeed, if failure to follow a perfect vector down the 
highway or keeping one's eyes on the road were sufficient reasons to suspect a 
person of driving while impaired, a substantial portion of the public would be subject 
each day to an invasion of their privacy." Id.; United States v. Colin, 314 F.3d 439, 
446 (9th Cir. 2002). Sandy City v. Thorsness. 778 P. 2d 1011,1012-13 (Utah Ct.App. 
1989). The trial court accepted this as no indication of impairment or corroboration. 
See Suppression Ruling, January 15,2008. 
Authorizing a stop for such cause would impose no standard at all. Adopting it 
here would allow essentially unfettered discretion and permit the arbitrary invasions of 
privacy by government officials addressed by the Fourth Amendment and Article I, 
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Section 14. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,661 (1979); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 
47,52(1979). 
In Sandy City v. Thorsness. 778 P. 2d 1011,1012-13 (Utah Ct.App. 1989), 
the defendant had appealed a DUI conviction. He has also challenged the stop as 
lacking justifiable cause. The officer there had stopped to assist a stranded motorist 
to the side of roadway. He had waved the defendant's vehicle to go around and 
noted he had pulled away at a "slow rate of speed" when there was no other traffic in 
the area. He concluded his assistance he pursued defendant's car. He caught up 
with defendant and followed him for several blocks. The officer did not observe any 
suspicious or exceptionable driving behavior, or traffic violations. He noted that 
defendant drove slowly in the inside lane, twenty miles per hour in a forty-mile-per-
hour zone. Defendant did not commit any traffic violations and traffic was not 
impeded. After several blocks, the officer activated his emergency lights, and pulled 
defendant off to the side of the road. 
The Court noted that the slower driving speed and his failure to "move on 
immediately" when requested may have given some indicia of intoxication but they 
are equally indicative of innocent behavior and, without more, do not provide a 
reasonable basis to suspect defendant of being intoxicated. 
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In State v. Tetmevr, 47 P2d 1157 (Utah App. 1997), this Court also found 
where the officer's cause to stop a motorist is based on observations indication of 
innocent behavior as well as possible criminal is lacks justification. 
We hold that, taken together, these four articulated 
circumstances do not provide reasonable suspicion that 
defendant was driving while under the influence. Instead 
these circumstances "describe a very large category of 
presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to 
virtually random seizures were [we] to conclude that as 
little foundation as there was in this case could justify a 
seizure." Reid v. Georgia. 448 U.S. 438, 441. 
In Salt Lake City v. Bench, the Court noted that Bench's conduct, far from 
being suggestive of intoxication, was "consistent with the habits and conduct of a 
normal driver.... [Wjithout more, [it did] not provide a reasonable basis to suspect 
[him] of being intoxicated." 
Numerous Courts have also agreed finding weaving within a single traffic is 
indicative of normai behavior and does not give rise to the reasonable suspicion. 
See Warrick v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety. 374 N.W. 585,585-586 (Minn.Ct.App. 1985) 
(weaving within lane of travel insufficient to support reasonable suspicion); Salter v. 
North Dakota Dept. of Transp.. 505 N.W. 2d 111,112-113 (N.D. 1993) (weaving 
described as "slight movement back and forth" insufficient to support reasonable 
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suspicion); State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215,220 (Tenn. 2000) (multiple lateral 
movements which were "not pronounced" are insufficient to support reasonable 
suspicion). 
CALLS FROM DISPATCH 
"[P]olice officers can rely on a dispatched report in making an investigatory 
stop," as long as "the dispatched report contains] articulable facts to support a 
finding of reasonable suspicion." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,940 (Utah 1994); 
State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 650-51 (Utah 1989). 
When the dispatched report is based on a call from an eyewitness, the 
officer is entitled to rely on that report 'so long as it contains sufficient articulable 
facts and the witness is reliable'. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 940 ; State v. Case, 884 
P.2d 1274,1278-79 (Utah Ct.App. 1994) (holding that reasonable, articulable 
suspicion did not exist because "[t]he source and content of the information which 
prompted the broadcast are simply unknown"). 
The legality of a stop if based on information imparted via a call to dispatch; 
it must have sufficient articulable facts to justify the stop. United States v. Henslev, 
469 U.S. 221, 233,105 S.Ct. 675, 682, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985). State v. Case, 884 
P.2d at 1277. The officer's basis for the stop is no better that the initial report 
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received by dispatch. State v. Carpena. 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986); State v. Truiillo, 
739 P.2d 85 (Utah Ct.App. 1987) Salt Lake City v. Ray. 2000 Ut App 55,998 P. 2d 
274. 
In State v. Case, the officers stop and detained a motorist based on a 
dispatch call suggesting a possible vehicle burglary. The initial call was from an 
anonymous source. The Court in finding the search illegal, relying heavily on United 
States v. Henslev. 469 U.S. 221, 232,105 S.Ct. 675,682, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985). 
Accord State v. Bruce. 779 P.2d 646.650 650 (Utah 1989); State v. Seel, 827 P.2d 
954,960 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). 
The Henslev Court found investigating officer may rely on a flyer or bulletin 
from other police departments to justify an investigative stop, but only "if the police 
who issued the flyer or bulletin possessed a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop." 
Id. at 232,105 S.Ct. at 682. In Whitelev v. Warden. 401 U.S. 560,91 S.Ct. 1031, 
28 LEd.2d 306 (1971), the Court held that an officer can make a valid arrest based 
on broadcast information only if the department issuing the information had sufficient 
probable cause to support the arrest warrant. Whitelev, 401 U.S. at 568,91 S.Ct. at 
1037. Applying the Whitelev approach, the Henslev Court concluded that the officer 
or department who issues a directive for investigation to other police must have 
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sufficient reasonable suspicion, through specific and articulable facts, to support the 
stop. Henslev, 469 U.S. at 232,105 S.Ct. at 682. Conversely, "[i]f the flyer has been 
issued in the absence of a reasonable suspicion, then a stop in the objective reliance 
upon it violates the Fourth Amendment." Id. See generally 3 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 9.3(f) (2d ed. 1987). See also Salt Lake City v. Bench, 2008 
ULApp. 30,177 P. 3d 655; State v. Rovbal. 2008 Ut. App 286,191 P.3d 822; State 
v. Martinez, 2008 Ut App 90,182 P.3d 385. 
CONCLUSION BY INFORMANT 
The trial court in its findings of January 15,2008 side stepped the factual 
basis asserted by Travis Bird (odor of alcohol / talked to son) to justify his conclusion 
of intoxication. However, Courts are reluctant to adopt conclusionary statements to 
find of probable cause. Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213,239. Statev. Droneburg. 781 
P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1989, State v. Dabble. 2003 UTApp 389, 81 P.3d 783; 
Kavsville City v. Mulcahv, 943 P.2d 231, 235-36 (Utah Ct.App. 1997). 
In State v. Saddler, 2004 UT 105,104 P.3d 1265 found no technical legal 
standard should be utilized but recognized that certain factors are to be considered 
including the basis of knowledge of the informant. State v. Keener, 2008 UT App 
288,191 P.3d 835. 
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In Salt Lake City v. Bench. 2008 Ut. App. 30,177 P. 3d 655, the Court 
properly questioned the motivation of the caller (ex wife). See also State v. Rovbal, 
2008 Ut. App 286,191 P.3d 822 questioning the reliability of the report of a live-in 
girlfriend who had called dispatch after a domestic dispute. 
Under a 'totality of circumstances' test, one must question reliability of the 
informant.. Court consider several factors when determining the reliability of an 
informant's tip, including (1) "the type of tip or informant,"; (2) "whether the informant 
gave enough detail about the observed criminal activity to support a stop,"; and (3) 
"whether the police officer's personal observations confirm the dispatcher's report of 
the informant's tip. State v. Rovbal, 2008 Ut. App 286,191 P.3d 822. 
Here, the trial court mistakenly adopted the informant's conclusion of 
intoxication. As a concerned citizen, Mr. Bird, is to be given greater reliability than 
an unknown or criminal informant. State v. Saddler, 2004 UT 105,104 P.3d 1265. 
Yet, a mere conclusion offered by a citizen does not rise to the level of reasonable 
cause. The question then arises to his basis of his knowledge justifying the stop. 
Here, his conclusion is based on an odor of alcohol and an innocent communication 
with the caller's son. Under the 'totality 'standard, it is difficult how to see how one 
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could draw a conclusion of intoxication based on these limited factors. Mr. Bird at 
trial conceded this issue. (TT 49 L. 17-24) 
OFFICER'S CORROBORATION 
The officer's corroboration offered nothing to justify the stop. His 
observations bring into question the reliability of the information. The officer saw 
nothing that would aid in a determination of impaired driving. The officer observation 
should have drawn into question the propriety of the dispatch call. 
Corroborating details relating to a person's physical description "is not 
corroboration of criminal activity, only of physical characteristics that by themselves 
have no relevance to criminal activity See State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1279. The trial 
correct mistakenly relied on the officer's corroboration only of the description of the 
vehicle and the report path of travel as sufficient corroboration. 
ODOR OF ALCOHOL 
In the present setting, the dispatcher received information of innocent 
conduct. The odor of alcohol is neither illegal nor indicative of criminal behavior. 
State v. Hechtle 2004 Utah App. 96,89 P.3d 185; State v. Ellison. A04A2268 
(Ga.App. 2005). State v. Lorton. 149 N.H. 732,829 A.2d 647 ; State v. Patefield. 927 
P.2d 655 (Ct. App. Utah 1996); State v. Tetmevr. 47 P2d 1157 (Utah App. 1997). 
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Point 3 
FIFTH AMENDMENT ASSERTION 
The Court allowed the State to offer evidence of the defendant's assertion 
of his Fifth Amendment rights. Defendant sought the Court to exclude any comment 
or evidence which by reference or inference comments on the defendant's invocation 
of his Fifth Amendment rights. The Court ruled the defendant's right assertion of his 
Fifth Amendment rights did not apply to either the field sobriety tests or the chemical 
tests. The Court permitted the defendant's assertion of his Fifth Amendment rights 
as evidence of guilt. 
It is well settled that the assertion of the defendant's constitutional right 
against self-incrimination results has no evidentiary value. Miranda v. Arizona. 384 
U.S. 436, (1964); Griffen v. California. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). Dovle v. Ohio. 426 U.S. 
610 (1976). State v.Maas, 1999 UT App 325,991 P.2d 1108. 
In State v. Urias,609 P.2d 1326 (Utah 1980), the court noted "when a 
person invokes his constitutional rights, the prosecution should not comment 
thereon, nor so use it in any way that will tend to impair or destroy that privilege." 
27 
Here the trial court allowed the State to comment on the defendant's imposition of 
his Fifth Amendment rights as indicia of guilty referencing both the field sobriety tests 
and the intoxilyzer. 
It is also noted that the officer did not advise the defendant that the riqht to 
silence and the right to counsel does not apply to the implied consent law which is 
civil in nature as required by the Department of Public Safety. He did not advise the 
right to refuse to take the chemical tests does not implicate the Fifth Amendment 
right to silence as required by U.C.A. 41-6a-520. 
An identical case to this issue is State v. Fish, 321 Or. 48 (1995), 893 P.2d 
1023. There a deputy sheriff observed the defendant's vehicle swerve while traveling 
the opposite direction of the deputy. He stopped the defendant and then smelled 
alcohol, saw his eyes were "bloodshot and watery," and noticed a can of beer on the 
floor of the vehicle next to the driver's seat. Defendant told the deputy that he had 
consumed "three beers." The deputy asked defendant to step out of his vehicle and 
perform field sobriety tests. The deputy advised defendant that, if defendant refused 
to perform the field sobriety tests, his refusal could be used against him as evidence 
in court. Defendant refused to perform the tests. He was arrested and charged with 
the crime of driving under the influence of intoxicants. 
28 
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress evidence of his refusal to 
perform the tests. He argued that the admission of his refusal to perform field 
sobriety tests violated his rights against self-incrimination under Article I, section 12, 
of the Oregon Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution. The district court granted defendant's motion on both statutory 
and constitutional grounds. The State appealed the district court's order suppressing 
evidence of refusal. The Oregon Supreme Court referenced Article I, section 12, of 
the Oregon Constitution which provides, in part, as the Utah Constitution does: 
"No person shall be * * * compelled in any criminal 
prosecution to testify against himself." 
The Oregon Court determine evidence of defendant's refusal to perform 
field sobriety tests was "testimonial" evidence under Article I, section 12 and thereby 
not evidence of guilty. They found the offering an individual's refusal to perform field 
sobriety tests into evidence, the State wanted the jury to infer from the fact of an 
individual's refusal that he or she is saying, "I refuse to perform field sobriety tests 
because I believe I will fail them." Thus, the fact that a person refused or failed to 
perform field sobriety tests inferential^ may communicate the person's belief — that 
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the person refused to perform the tests because he or she believed that the 
performance of the tests would be incriminating. 
For an individual to reveal his or her thoughts is necessarily to make a 
communication, whether by words or actions. Evidence of an individual's refusal 
therefore communicates his or her state of mind. Facts giving rise to inferences, no 
less than direct statements, communicating an individual's state of mind is evidence 
that is subject to the right against compelled self-incrimination. They then concluded 
evidence of defendant's refusal to perform field sobriety tests is "testimonial" 
evidence under the self-incrimination clause of Article I, section 12, of the Oregon 
Constitution and suppressed any comment on them. Also State v. Dumford, 149 Or. 
App. 1(1997), 941 P.2d 1042. 
The Utah Constitution provides in Art I Section 12 the following: 
In criminal prosecutions . . . The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; . . . 
Under the trial court's ruling, a person is required to given evidence against 
himself and unless he fails to do so, it may be used as evidence of guilt. He is 
punished by invoking his State and Federal constitutional privilege. See American 
Fork City v. Crosqrove.701 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1985). 
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CONCLUSION 
The verdict herein should be reversed. The evidence is lacking to support a 
conviction that the defendant was incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle. The 
evidence was to the contrary. Defendant not only operated his vehicle in a lawful 
fashion but in a very cautious manner. 
The stop of the defendant was without a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
wrongdoing. The act of talking with a six year old boy in a teasing fashion in 
combination with a consumption of an alcoholic beverage is not evidence of illegal 
behavior. 
The assertion of the rights guaranteed under both the Federal and State 
Constitution is not evidence of guilt. The introduction of such impairs and essentially 
destroys the privilege. The trial court committed error when the Court allowed the 
admission of such testimony. 
DATED this 26th day of pgcember, 2008. 
Shelden Carter 1 / 
Attorney for Appellant 
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F-ob V(Iht>af^o 
18:58:14, 9/25/07: call to dispatch from citizen informant: 
citizen informant calling to report a drunk driver 
informant was at the Sports Park in SF 
The vehicle was a green Jeep Cherokee, which was headed out of the park 
It had a dealer plate-6734002 
The vehicle was leaving the new part of the park. 
The driver had black hair and a goatee 
The vehicle was a green Jeep Grand Cherokee 
It turned toward Main St 
Caller was Travis Bird, gave his phone number 310-7195 
Why did he think the driver was intoxicated? 
Walked past Mr. Bird and his son 
tried to talk to his son 
both Mr. and Mrs. Bird smelled alcohol on his breath 
He was "thoroughly intoxicated"-the way he was acting 
He tried to strike up a conversation with "my little boy" 
9/25/07, around 7p.m., Officer Johnson received a dispatch call (on his laptop)from dispatch 
He was traveling on Main St SB. Dispatched to area of the Sportspark (which is approx 900 S. 
Main) on the report of an intoxicated motorist 
Description given to him on laptop: 
green Jeep Cherokee/poss dui/just leaving the new part of ball park 6734002 
dealer plate/male with goatee/tl one minute/went towards main st unk from 
there walked past rp and could smell the alcohol on his breath and definitely intoxicated 
Officer saw a dark-colored Jeep Cherokee with dealer plates turn left on Main St. from Volunteer 
Dr, where the Sportspark is located. 
He followed the vehicle NB on Main St for approx. 9 blocks without turning on his emergency 
lights. The Jeep Cherokee pulled to the shoulder of the road at approx 50 N. Main St 
His observations, as told at the PH: p. 7-"The vehicle was traveling on the inside divider lane, 
and it would pull back into the travel lane. It would drift from side-to-side within the travel lane, 
and then travel on the divider line, and then travel back into the travel lane again." 
At the hearing on 1/15/08, the officer clarified what he saw; 
The driver drifted back and forth in the right-hand (outside) NB lane of travel. The left 
rear wheel of the vehicle drove on top of the left hash marks (or left divider line) 3 times and 
drifted to the left without driving on top of the left hash marks one or two other times during that 
9 blocks of travel. He never saw the vehicle signal or change lanes. 
Although there is a conflict between the DUI report form and his written narrative report, 
the officer maintains that the written nairative report is accurate, and that the vehicle turned from 
ANALYSIS 
I. Weaving within the lane and dispatch's notice 
The officer did not initiate the stop. The defendant pulled over to the shoulder of the road of his 
own accord. 
However, this escalates to a level two stop when the officer turns on his overheads. At that 
point, the defendant is not free to leave. Further, when the def exits his car and turns to the 
officer, the officer orders the defendant back into the car. The def is clearly not free to leave at 
this point. 
In order for the def to prevail on his motion to suppress the stop, he must persuade the court that 
the officer did not have "reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred or is occurring." 
U.C.A. 77-23-103. 
The case law (as cited by the def.) is very clear that simple weaving within the lane of travel with 
nothing more does not amount to reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred or is 
occurring. It's difficult to disagree with the language quoted by the def in his memo from United 
States v. Colin, 314 F.3d 439, 446 (9th Cir. 2002): 
Indeed, if failure to follow a perfect vector down the highway or keeping 
one's eyes on the road were sufficient reasons to suspect a person of driving while 
impaired, a substantial portion of the public would be subject each day to an 
invasion of their privacy. 
The State makes the valid argument that the officer had more than just the def s weaving pattern 
to justify his activation of his overhead lights. The State correctly cites UCA 77-7-15 for the 
concept that a police officer may "stop any person in a public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a 
public offense and may demand his name, address and an explanation of his actions." 
City of St George v. Carter, 945 P.2d 165 (Ut App 1997): "The facts supporting reasonable 
suspicion may come from the officer's own observation as well as 'information, bulletins, or 
flyers received from other law enforcement sources." (Quoting another case) . . . "The legality of 
a stop based on info imparted by another will depend on the sufficiency of the articulable facts 
known to the officer originating the information or bulletin subsequently received and acted upon 
by the investigating officer. However, the investigating officer need not be actually informed of 
all the underlying facts known to the originating officer that establish reasonable suspicion." 
The defendant relies upon an earlier case, State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274 (Ut. App. 1994), that 
rules along the same lines. I find that the facts of that case are distinguishable from this case, as 
in that case, the officer received absolutely no information re: criminal activity. He was told that 
there was a possible car prowl or burglary was given a description of the suspect as "male with a 
chunky build, possibly Hispanic, wearing a white tee shirt." Apparently, dispatch had received 
no more information than that from an anonymous caller. Because the officer did not 
independently observe any criminal activity and because the facts given to dispatch were 
insufficient, the stop was suppressed. The most important language for our purposes today is: 
"However, if the investigation culminates in arrest and the legality of the stop is challenged, the 
State becomes obligated, albeit after the fact, to show that legally sufficient articulable suspicion 
prompted issuance of the fly or dispatch in the first place." Hence, I have looked at the original 
information supplied by Mr. Bird in his telephone call to dispatch. Not only did Mr. Bird give 
information as to why he thought the defendant was drunk, he observed that the defendant was 
thoroughly intoxicated. In addition, the officer independently observed the def s driving pattern, 
which, although not a violation of the law, corroborated Mr. Bird's observations and report. 
I turn to Kavsville City v. Mulcahy* 943 P.2d 231, for the following proposition: "an informant's 
tip constitutes reasonable suspicion to justify a detention or seizure of a vehicle and its 
driver if the info is reliable, provides sufficient detail of criminal activity, and is confirmed 
by the investigating officer. A tip from a citizen informant who gives his or her name is highly 
reliable because the police may verify the info and it subjects the informant to penalty if the info 
is false. Furthermore, unlike a paid police informant, the uncompensated citizen-informer's 
motive is community concern rather than self interest." 
In this case, we know who the informant was, as he gave his name to dispatch. Both he and his 
wife later gave written statements that were used at preliminary hearing. Their natmes were 
Travis and Heidi Bird (who was in the background during the dispatch call), citizen informants 
who called dispatch. We now know exactly what they told dispatch, and that info was relayed to 
the officer in written form on his laptop computer. That information included an accurate 
description of the vehicle and its location. It also included Mr. Bird's conclusion that the def was 
intoxicated and his reasons for that belief. 
In addition to the def s weaving within the lane, the officer had been told by dispatch that he was 
reporting to the area of the Sports Park re: an intoxicated motorist. The officer was able to 
quickly find a car which matched the description of the information given to the officer by 
dispatch-a green-colored Jeep Cherokee with dealer plates with the same plate number relayed 
by Mr. Bird. He found the vehicle in the area of the Sports Park, just as Mr. Bird had informed 
dispatch regarding the car's location. The court finds that Mr. Bird's information was 
reliable and was corroborated by what the officer found, i.e., the same vehicle, same 
description, same dealer license plate number. 
Did Mr. Bird's information provide sufficient detail of criminal activity? The defendant argues 
that it does not, because it only provided information from Mr. Bird that the defendant: 
Walked past Mr. Bird and his son 
tried to talk to his son 
both Mr. and Mrs. Bird smelled alcohol on his breath 
He was "thoroughly intoxicated"-the way he was acting 
He tried to strike up a conversation with "my little boy" 
Volunteer Drive onto the far outside lane (#2) NB of Main St. 
Main St is a 4-lane rd, with a center median strip. Two travel lanes in each direction. The Jeep 
Cherokee was in the far right lane, closest to the curb for the entire 9 blocks. It wove within the 
lane 3-4 times. 
On cross-examination, the officer testified that he did not observe any traffic violations. 
P. 8: Did this cause you any conceni? It did. Why is that? I was attempting to observe a driving 
pattern, due to the report that it was a possible intoxicated motorist. Did that corroborate the 
information you received? Yes. 
The officer did not run the dealer plate. 
The vehicle pulled to the shoulder of the road. The officer pulled in behind the vehicle and then 
activated his emergency lights. After he activated his lights, the driver of the vehicle 
immediately exited the vehicle. 
The defendant turned and looked at the officer (after He got out of the Jeep), and the officer asked 
him to get back in his car. The def complied with the request. 
DISPATCH CALL 
DISPATCH: 911 what is the address of your emergency? 
CALLER: I am at the Spanish Fork Sports Park. 
DISPATCH Ok. 
CALLER I just want to report a drunk driver. He just got in a Jeep Cherokee. 
DISPATCH: Ok. What color? 
CALLER: It's a green Jeep Cherokee 
DISPATCH: Ok where is she headed. 
CALLER: You know what he is headed out of the park right now. 
DISPATCH: Tell me what way she turns on Volunteer Drive? 
CALLER: I could not, I can't see that far. He just... 
DISPATCH: Did you happen to get a plate? 
Yes. Hold on a sec my wife got it. Hold on. I think its 6734002 that's a dealer license 
CALLER: plate. 
DISPATCH: Ok. 4003? 
CALLER: Two. 
DISPATCH: Two? Ok. 
Ya, hold on a sec. Let me confirm that, that's what it is (off the phone: "6734002?") 
CALLER: ya that's... 
DISPATCH: Ok. Where you at the new part of the ball park or the old? So she left the new part? 
CALLER: Ya Ya. 
DISPATCH: Ok. 
CALLER: It's a him. It's a he. He has black hair. Has a gotee. 
DISPATCH: Ok. 
CALLER: It's a, it's a green Jeep Cherokee, Jeep Grand Cherokee. 
DISPATCH: Ok. Did he go towards that Riverview Elementary or did he go towards north Main stree 
CALLER: Towards Main street. 
DISPATCH: And can I get your name? 
CALLER: Ya. It's Travis Bird. B-l-R-D. 
DISPATCH: And what's a phone number for you? 
CALLER: 310-7195 
DISPATCH: Ok. And can you tell me why you think he was intoxicated? 
Oh, he walked right pass me and my son and he was trying to talk to my son. 
CALLER: You could smell it on his breath and my wife smelled him too. The guy was 
just clearly intoxicated. He was just, the way he was acting. 
He tried to strike up a conversation with my little boy. 
DISPATCH: Ok. Alright I will go ahead and let the Spanish Fork officers know. Ok? 
CALLER: Ok, thank you. 
DISPATCH: Thanks. Bye. 
